We consider how to make probability forecasts of binary labels. Our main mathematical result is that for any continuous gambling strategy used for detecting disagreement between the forecasts and the actual labels, there exists a forecasting strategy whose forecasts are ideal as far as this gambling strategy is concerned. A forecasting strategy obtained in this way from a gambling strategy demonstrating a strong law of large numbers is simplified and studied empirically.
Introduction
Probability forecasting can be thought of as a game between two players, Forecaster and Reality:
FOR n = 1, 2, . . . :
Reality announces x n ∈ X. Forecaster announces p n ∈ [0, 1]. Reality announces y n ∈ {0, 1}.
On each round, Forecaster predicts Reality's move y n chosen from the label space, always taken to be {0, 1} in this paper. His move, the probability forecast p n , can be interpreted as the probability he attaches to the event y n = 1. To help Forecaster, Reality presents him with an object x n at the beginning of the round; x n are chosen from an object space X. Forecaster's goal is to produce p n that agree with the observed y n . Various results of probability theory, in particular limit theorems (such as the weak and strong laws of large numbers, the law of the iterated logarithm, and the central limit theorem) and large-deviation inequalities (such as Hoeffding's inequality), describe different aspects of agreement between p n and y n . For example, according to the strong law of large numbers, we expect that
Such results will be called laws of probability and the existing body of laws of probability will be called classical probability theory. In §2, following [12] , we formalize Forecaster's goal by adding a third player, Skeptic, who is allowed to gamble at the odds given by Forecaster's probabilities. We state a result from [14] and [12] suggesting that Skeptic's gambling strategies can be used as tests of agreement between p n and y n and that all tests of agreement between p n and y n can be expressed as Skeptic's gambling strategies. Therefore, the forecasting protocol with Skeptic provides an alternative way of stating laws of probability.
As demonstrated in [12] , many standard proof techniques developed in classical probability theory can be translated into continuous strategies for Skeptic. In §3 we show that for any continuous strategy S for Skeptic there exists a strategy F for Forecaster such that S does not detect any disagreement between the y n and the p n produced by F . This result is a "meta-theorem" that allows one to move from laws of probability to forecasting algorithms: as soon as a law of probability is expressed as a continuous strategy for Skeptic, we have a forecasting algorithm that guarantees that this law will hold; there are no assumptions about Reality, who may play adversarially.
Our meta-theorem is of any interest only if one can find sufficiently interesting laws of probability (expressed as gambling strategies) that can serve as its input. In §4 we apply it to the important properties of unbiasedness in the large and small of the forecasts p n ( (1) is an asymptotic version of the former). The resulting forecasting strategy is automatically unbiased, no matter what data x 1 , y 1 , x 2 , y 2 , . . . is observed.
In §5 we simplify the algorithm obtained in §4 and demonstrate its performance on some artificially generated data sets.
The gambling framework for testing probability forecasts
Skeptic is allowed to bet at the odds defined by Forecaster's probabilities, and he refutes the probabilities if he multiplies his capital manyfold. This is formalized as a perfect-information game in which Skeptic plays against a team composed of Forecaster and Reality:
Binary Forecasting Game I Players: Reality, Forecaster, Skeptic
Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ X. Forecaster announces p n ∈ [0, 1]. Skeptic announces s n ∈ R. Reality announces y n ∈ {0, 1}. K n := K n−1 + s n (y n − p n ). Restriction on Skeptic: Skeptic must choose the s n so that his capital is always nonnegative (K n ≥ 0 for all n) no matter how the other players move. This is a perfect-information protocol; the players move in the order indicated, and each player sees the other player's moves as they are made. It specifies both an initial value for Skeptic's capital (K 0 = 1) and a lower bound on its subsequent values (K n ≥ 0).
Our interpretation, which will be called the testing interpretation, of Binary Forecasting Game I is that K n measures the degree to which Skeptic has shown Forecaster to do a bad job of predicting y i , i = 1, . . . , n.
Validity and universality of the testing interpretation
As explained in [12] , the testing interpretation is valid and universal in an important sense. Let us assume, for simplicity, that objects are absent (formally, that |X| = 1). In the case where Forecaster starts from a probability measure P on {0, 1} ∞ and obtains his forecasts p n ∈ [0, 1] as conditional probabilities under P that y n = 1 given y 1 , . . . , y n−1 , we have a standard way of testing P and, therefore, p n : choose an event A ⊆ {0, 1} ∞ (the critical region) with a small P (A) and reject P if A happens. The testing interpretation satisfies the following two properties:
Validity Suppose Skeptic's strategy is measurable and p n are obtained from P ;
K n then form a nonnegative martingale w.r. to P . According to Doob's inequality [14, 3] , for any positive constant C, sup n K n ≥ C with Pprobability at most 1/C. (If Forecaster is doing a bad job according to the testing interpretation, he is also doing a bad job from the standard point of view.)
Universality According to Ville's theorem ( [12] , §8.5), for any positive constant ǫ and any event A ⊆ {0, 1} ∞ such that P (A) < ǫ, Skeptic has a measurable strategy that ensures lim inf n→∞ K n > 1/ǫ whenever A happens, provided p n are computed from P . (If Forecaster is doing a bad job according to the standard point of view, he is also doing a bad job according to the testing interpretation.) In the case P (A) = 0, Skeptic actually has a measurable strategy that ensures lim n→∞ K n = ∞ on A.
The universality of the gambling scenario of Binary Forecasting Game I is its most important advantage over von Mises's gambling scenario based on subsequence selection; it was discovered by Ville [14] .
Continuity of gambling strategies
In [12] we constructed Skeptic's strategies that made him rich when the statement of any of several key laws of probability theory was violated. The constructions were explicit and lead to continuous gambling strategies. We conjecture that every natural result of classical probability theory leads to a continuous strategy for Skeptic.
Defeating Skeptic
In this section we prove the main (albeit very simple) mathematical result of this paper: for any continuous strategy for Skeptic there exists a strategy for Forecaster that does not allow Skeptic's capital to grow, regardless of what Reality is doing. Actually, our result will be even stronger: we will have Skeptic announce his strategy for each round before Forecaster's move on that round rather than making him announce his full strategy at the beginning of the game, and we will drop the restriction on Skeptic. Therefore, we consider the following perfect-information game that pits Forecaster against the two other players:
Binary Forecasting Game II Players: Reality, Forecaster, Skeptic Protocol:
Reality announces x n ∈ X. Skeptic announces continuous S n :
Reality announces y n ∈ {0, 1}.
Theorem 1 Forecaster has a strategy in Binary Forecasting Game II that en-
Proof Forecaster can use the following strategy to ensure
• if the function S n (p) takes the value 0, choose p n so that S n (p n ) = 0;
• if S n is always positive, take p n := 1;
• if S n is always negative, take p n := 0.
Examples of gambling strategies
In this section we discuss strategies for Forecaster obtained by Theorem 1 from different strategies for Skeptic; the former will be called defensive forecasting strategies. There are many results of classical probability theory that we could use, but we will concentrate on the simple strategy described in [12] , p. 69, for proving the strong law of large numbers. If S n (p) = S n does not depend on p, the strategy from the proof of Theorem 1 makes Forecaster choose
The basic procedure described in [12] (p. 69) is as follows. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5] be a small number (expressing our tolerance to violations of the strong law of large numbers). In Binary Forecasting Game I, Skeptic can ensure that
using the strategy s n = s ǫ n := ǫK n−1 . Indeed, since
on the paths where K n is bounded we have
(we have used the fact that ln(1 + t) ≥ t − t 2 when |t| ≤ 0.5). If Skeptic wants to ensure
he can use the strategy s n := (s ǫ n + s −ǫ n )/2, and if he wants to ensure
he can use a convex mixture of (s ǫ n + s −ǫ n )/2 over a sequence of ǫ converging to zero. There are also standard ways of strengthening (3) to
for details, see [12] .
In the rest of this section we will draw on the excellent survey [2] . We will see how Forecaster defeats increasingly sophisticated strategies for Skeptic.
Unbiasedness in the large
Following Murphy and Epstein [7] , we say that Forecaster is unbiased in the large if (1) holds. Let us first consider the one-sided relaxed version of this property lim sup
The strategy for Skeptic described above, S n (p) := ǫK n , leads to Forecaster always choosing p n := 1; (4) is then satisfied in a trivial way. Forecaster's strategy corresponding to the two-sided version
is not much more reasonable. Indeed, it can be represented as follows. The initial capital 1 is split evenly between two accounts, and Skeptic gambles with the two accounts separately. If at the outset of round n the capital on the first account is K 
Therefore, Forecaster's move is p n := 1 if
and p n can be chosen arbitrarily in the case of equality. The limiting form of this strategy as ǫ → 0 is: Forecaster's move is p n := 1 if
and p n can be chosen arbitrarily in the case of equality.
We can see that unbiasedness in the large does not lead to interesting forecasts: Forecaster fulfils his task too well. In the one-sided case (4), he always chooses p n := 1 making
as small as possible. In the two-sided case (5) with ǫ → 0, he manages to guarantee that
His goals are achieved with categorical forecasts, p n ∈ {0, 1}.
In the rest of this section we consider the more interesting case where S n (p) depends on p.
Unbiasedness in the small
We now consider a subtler requirement that forecasts should satisfy, which we introduce informally. We say that the forecasts p n are unbiased in the small (or reliable, or valid, or well calibrated) if, for any p
provided i=1,...,n:pi≈p * 1 is not too small. Let us first consider just one value for p * . Instead of the "crisp" point p *
we will consider a "fuzzy point" I : The strategy for Skeptic ensuring (2) can be modified as follows. Let ǫ ∈ (0, 0.5] be again a small number. Now we consider the strategy S n (p) = S ǫ,I n (p) := ǫI(p)K n−1 . Since
(the last step involves replacing I 2 (p i ) with I(p i ); the loss of precision is not great if I is close to
The last inequality shows that the mean of y i for p i close to p * is close to p * provided we have observed sufficiently many such p i ; its interpretation is especially simple when I is close to I [p−,p+] .
In general, we may consider a mixture of S . If we make sure that the mixture is continuous (which is always the case for continuous I and finitely many ǫ and I), Theorem 1 provides us with forecasts that are unbiased in the small.
Using the objects
Unbiasedness, even in the small, is only a necessary but far from sufficient condition for good forecasts: for example, a forecaster who ignores the objects x n can be perfectly calibrated, no matter how much useful information x n contain. (Cf. the discussion of resolution in [2] ; we prefer not to use the term "resolution", which is too closely connected with the very special way of probability forecasting based on sorting and labeling.) It is easy to make the algorithm of the previous subsection take the objects into account: we can allow the test functions I to depend not only on p but also on the current object x n ; S n (p) then becomes a mixture of
and S −ǫ,I n (p) (defined analogously) over ǫ and I.
Relation to a standard counter-example
Suppose, for simplicity, that objects are absent (|X| = 1). The standard construction from Dawid [1] showing that no forecasting strategy produces forecasts p n that are unbiased in the small for all sequences is as follows. Define an infinite sequence y 1 , y 2 , . . . recursively by
where p n is the forecast produced by the forecasting strategy after seeing y 1 , . . . , y n−1 . For the forecasts p n < 0.5 we always have y n = 1 and for the forecasts p n ≥ 0.5 we always have y n = 0; obviously, we do not have unbiasedness in the small.
Let us see what Dawid's construction gives when applied to the defensive forecasting strategy constructed from the mixture of S ǫ,I n (p) and S −ǫ,I n (p), as described above, over different ǫ and different I; we will assume not only that the test functions I cover all [0, 1] but also that each point p ∈ [0, 1] is covered by arbitrarily narrow (concentrated in a small neighborhood of p) test functions. It is clear that we will inevitably have p n → 0.5 if p n are produced by the defensive forecasting strategy and y n are produced by Dawid's construction. On the other hand, since all test functions I are continuous and so cannot sharply distinguish between the cases p n < 0.5 and p n ≥ 0.5, we do not have any contradiction: neither the test functions nor any observer who can only measure the p n with a finite precision can detect the lack of unbiasedness in the small.
In this paper we are only interested in unbiasedness in the small when the test functions I are required to be continuous. Dawid's construction shows that unbiasedness in the small is impossible to achieve if I are allowed to be indicator functions of intervals (such as [0, 0.5) and [0.5, 1]). To achieve unbiasedness in the small in this stronger sense, randomization appears necessary (see, e.g., [18] ). It is interesting that already a little bit of randomization suffices, as explained in [5] .
Simplified algorithm
Let us assume first that objects are absent, |X| = 1. It was observed empirically that the performance of defensive forecasting strategies with a fixed ǫ does not depend on ǫ much (provided it is not too large; e.g., in the above calculations we assumed ǫ ≤ 0.5). This suggests letting ǫ → 0 (in particular, we will assume that ǫ ≪ n −2 ). As the test functions I we will take Gaussian bells I j with standard deviation σ > 0 located densely and uniformly in the interval [0, 1]. Letting ≈ stand for approximate equality and using the shorthand ± f (±) := f (+) + f (−), we obtain:
where
This Mercer kernel can be approximated by
As a function of p, the last expression is proportional to the density of the sum of two Gaussian random variables of variance σ 2 ; therefore, it is proportional to
To get an idea of the properties of this forecasting strategy, which we call the K29 strategy (or algorithm), we run it and the Laplace forecasting strategy (p n := (k+1)/(n+1), where k is the number of 1s observed so far) on a randomly generated bit sequence of length 1000 (with the probability of 1 equal to 0.5). A zero point p n of S n was found using the simple bisection procedure (see, e.g., [9] , § §9. We did 10 iterations, after which the mid-point of the remaining interval was output as p n . Notice that the values S n (0) and S n (1) did not have to be tested. Our program was written in MATLAB, Version 7, and the initial state of the random number generator was set to 0. Figure 1 shows that the probabilities output by the K29 (σ = 0.01) and Laplace forecasting strategies are almost indistinguishable. To see that these two forecasting strategies can behave very differently, we complemented the 1000 bits generated as described above with 1000 0s followed by 1000 1s. The result is shown in Figure 2 . The K29 strategy detects that the probability p of 1 changes after the 1000th round, and fairly quickly moves down. When the probability changes again after the 2000th round, K29 starts moving toward p = 1, but interestingly, hesitates around the line p = 0.5, as if expecting the process to reverse to the original probability of 1.
The Mercer kernel
used in these experiments is known in machine learning as the Gaussian kernel (in the usual parameterization 4σ 2 is replaced by 2σ 2 or c); however, many other Mercer kernels also give reasonable results. If we start from test functions I depending on the object, instead of (8) we will arrive at the expression
where K is a Mercer kernel on the squared product ([0, 1] × X) 2 . There are standard ways of constructing such Mercer kernels from Mercer kernels on [0, 1] 2 and X 2 (see, e.g., the description of tensor products and direct sums in [13, 11] ). For S n to be continuous, we have to require that K be forecast-continuous in the following sense: for all x ∈ X and all (p
) is continuous as a function of p. The overall procedure can be summarized as follows.
K29 Algorithm
Read x n ∈ X. Define S n (p) as per (9) . Output any root p of S n (p) = 0 as p n ; if there are no roots, p n := (1 + sign(S n ))/2. Read y n ∈ {0, 1}.
Computer experiments reported in [16] show that the K29 algorithm performs well on a standard benchmark data set. For a theoretical discussion of the K29 algorithm, see [19] (Appendix) and [17] .
6 Related work and directions of further research This paper's methods connect two areas that have been developing independently so far: probability forecasting and classical probability theory. It appears that, when properly developed, these methods can benefit both areas:
• the powerful machinery of classical probability theory can be used for probability forecasting;
• practical problems of probability forecasting may suggest new laws of probability.
Classical probability theory started from Bernoulli's weak law of large numbers (1713) and is the subject of countless monographs and textbooks. The original statements of most of its results were for independent random variables, but they were later extended to the martingale framework; the latter was reduced to its game-theoretic core in [12] . The proof of the strong law of large numbers used in this paper was extracted from Ville's [14] martingale proof of the law of the iterated logarithm (upper half).
The theory of probability forecasting was a topic of intensive research in meteorology in the 1960s and 1970s; this research is summarized in [2] . Machine learning is still mainly concerned with categorical prediction, but the situation appears to be changing. Probability forecasting using Bayesian networks is a mature field; the literature devoted to probability forecasting using decision trees and to calibrating other algorithms is also fairly rich. So far, however, the field of probability forecasting has been developing without any explicit connections with classical probability theory.
Defensive forecasting is indirectly related, in a sense dual, to prediction with expert advice (reviewed in [15] , §4) and its special case, Bayesian prediction. In prediction with expert advice one starts with a given loss function and tries to make predictions that lead to a small loss as measured by that loss function. In defensive forecasting, one starts with a law of probability and then makes predictions such that this law of probability is satisfied. So the choice of the law of probability when designing the forecasting strategy plays a role analogous to the choice of the loss function in prediction with expert advice.
In prediction with expert advice one combines a pool of potentially promising forecasting strategies to obtain a forecasting strategy that performs not much worse than the best strategies in the pool. In defensive forecasting one combines strategies for Skeptic (such as the strategies corresponding to different test functions I and different ±ǫ in §4) to obtain one strategy achieving an interesting goal (such as unbiasedness in the small); a strategy for Forecaster is then obtained using Theorem 1. The possibility of mixing strategies for Skeptic is as fundamental in defensive forecasting as the possibility of mixing strategies for Forecaster in prediction with expert advice. This paper continues the work started by Foster and Vohra [4] and later developed in, e.g., [6, 10, 18] (the last paper replaces the von Mises-style framework of the previous papers with a martingale framework, as in this paper). The approach of this paper is similar to that of the recent paper [5] , which also considers deterministic forecasting strategies and continuous test functions for unbiasedness in the small.
The main difference of this paper's approach from the bulk of work in learning theory is that we do not make any assumptions about Reality's strategy.
The following directions of further research appear to us most important:
• extending Theorem 1 to other forecasting protocols (such as multi-label classification) and designing efficient algorithms for finding the corresponding p n ;
• exploring forecasting strategies corresponding to: (a) Hoeffding's inequality, (b) the central limit theorem, (c) the law of the iterated logarithm (all we did in this paper was to slightly extend the strong law of large numbers and then use it for probability forecasting).
